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Effects of Country-of-Origin 
Labeling on Meat Producers 
and Consumers 
Jayson L. Lusk  and John D. Anderson 
Although several studies  have estimated the costs of country-of-origin  labeling (COOL), 
no previous study has documented how these costs will be distributed across the live- 
stock sector or how producer and consumer welfare will be affected. This analysis 
presents an  equilibrium displacement model of the farm, wholesale, and retail markets 
for beef, pork, and poultry that documents how producers and consumers will be affected 
by COOL. Findings reveal that as  the costs of COOL are shifted from the producer to 
the processor and retailer, producers are made increasingly better off while consumers 
are made increasingly worse off. Further, an increase in aggregate consumer demand 
of 2% to 3%  is likely sufficient to  offset lost producer welfare due to COOL costs. 
Key words:  beef, country of origin, equilibrium displacement model, labeling, pork, 
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Introduction 
The 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) includes a provision 
requiring meat, fruits and vegetables, and peanuts to be labeled as to their country of 
origin. The original bill stipulated that the first two years of the program labeling will 
be voluntary, but country-of-origin labeling (COOL) will be mandatory by September 
2004, with potentially hefty fines imposed on retailers who violate labeling require- 
ment~.~  Terms of the COOL legislation stipulate: 
.  .  .  a retailer of a covered commodity shall inform consumers, at the final point of sale 
of the covered commodity to consumers, of the country of origin of the covered com- 
modity [Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Title X, Subtitle I, Sec. 10816, 
Subtitle D, Sec. 282(a)(l)]. 
Covered commodities defined in the legislation include beef, pork, and lamb (both 
ground and muscle cuts), fish (both wild and farm-raised), fruits and vegetables, and 
peanuts. In order to receive a U.S. country-of-origin label, a livestock product must be 
derived from an animal that was exclusively born, raised, and processed in the United 
States. COOL labeling requirements are  not applied to food service establishments (e.g., 
restaurants and cafeterias), nor do they apply to processed foods (e.g., beef in a can of 
beef stew). 
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A number of individuals and organizations have put forth different estimates of the 
cost of implementing COOL and have focused primarily on the beef andlor pork sectors. 
These estimates  vary depending  on the assumptions underlying the  analysis. Given that 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has not yet determined exactly how to 
implement mandatory COOL, it is impossible to know whose (if anyone's) assumptions 
are  accurate. Perhaps a more significant problem with existing cost estimates for COOL 
is the fact that  none provide insight into the impact COOL will have on meat prices and 
production,.  and ultimately on producer and consumer welfare. Further, no previous 
study has rigorously assessed how anticipated costs or potential benefits of COOL will 
be distributed among producers and consumers. 
The purpose of this research is to determine how COOL affects the welfare of partici- 
pants in the livestock sector. This analysis uses existing estimates of the cost of COOL 
to investigate the impact of these costs on producer and consumer surplus. Sensitivity 
analysis is used to determine how the incidence of costs (i.e., whether borne by producers 
or processors, or by retailers) affects the welfare of market participants. This research 
also investigates the degree to which consumer demand will need to increase to offset 
COOL costs, whether they are borne by the producer or the processor. These objectives 
are accomplished using an equilibrium displacement model adapted from Wohlgenant 
(1993). 
This work represents an  important extension of existing COOL studies. First, previous 
estimates of COOL'S impact have focused on costs while ignoring the more important 
issue of welfare as  measured by producer and consumer surplus. Simply reporting cost 
estimates can be misleading because costs, to some extent, can be passed through a 
marketing channel. The more relevant issue is  how producer welfare is affected by a cost 
increase. Second, results of this research are not dependent on a single set of assump- 
tions regarding the details of mandatory COOL implementation. Indeed, the impact of 
a number of different cost estimates-all  based on different assumptions-are  examined 
here. Finally, this study uses an equilibrium displacement model which characterizes 
the  vertical structure of the livestock industry from producer to processor to consumer, 
as well as the horizontal relationship across the beef, pork, and poultry sectors. The 
advantage of this approach is that it reveals how the implementation of mandatory 
COOL in the beef and pork sectors will affect producer surplus in the poultry sector, a 
sector closely related to the  beef and pork sectors but not required to implement COOL. 
Review of Previous COOL Studies 
In November  2002, the USDA's  Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) published a 
"Notice of Request for Emergency Approval of a New Information Collection." In this 
notice, AMS reported its estimate for the record-keeping costs associated with COOL. 
This estimate for all industries covered by COOL was $1.968 billion. USDNAMS esti- 
mated these costs would be distributed as  follows: $1  billion for producers, $340 million 
for food handlers, and $627.75 million for retailers. 
Since the publication of the USDNAMS cost estimate, others have developed their 
own estimates of  the costs (both direct and indirect) associated with COOL. Notably, 
Vansickle et al. (2003) took exception with the USDA estimate, arguing mandatory 
record keeping at the producer level is not required to satisfy either the spirit or the 
letter of the law. They advocated labeling all imported products so that any  product not Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Country-of Origin Labeling  187 
labeled as an import would be assumed to be of  U.S. origin. Using this assumption, 
VanSickle et al. estimated the record-keeping costs associated with COOL will be 
between $69.86 million and $193.43 million. One problem with the VanSickle et al. 
proposal is that it likely violates World Trade Organization guidelines and would be 
subject to challenge from any country claiming it was being adversely affected. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a 2003 report by Sparks  Companies, Inc., and Cattle 
Buyers Weekly estimated COOL will increase total costs by $3.66 to $5.60 billion dollars, 
not including the costs for the lamb and peanut sectors which are also covered by the 
COOL regulation. The Sparks estimate is  based on the assumption that improved record- 
keeping systems will be required throughout the supply  chain to  verify country-of-origin 
labels. 
Hayes and Meyer (2003)  similarly concluded the costs of COOL implementation would 
be significant. Based on their estimates, a system with full traceability would raise 
farm-level production costs for pork by $10.22/head (or by a total of just over $:L  billion). 
Hayes and Meyer also explored the potential impacts of  COOL resulting from a segre- 
gated system. Assuming an own-price elasticity of pork of  about -0.70, their projected 
$10/head increase in costs would result in a 7% decrease in retail pork demand. Further, 
they estimate that by 2010, U.S. pork exports could be reduced by 50% as a result of 
meat segregation due to COOL regulations. Grier and Kohl (2003)  also predicted several 
negative consequences of  COOL for the pork industry including the loss of over 1,000 
independent pork producers, the eventual closing of  three to five U.S. pork packing 
plants, lower hog prices, and an aggregate loss in economic activity in the United States 
of  over $4 billion. 
VanSickle et al. (2003)  were decidedly more optimistic in their evaluation of the 
impacts of COOL. Extrapolating from willingness-to-pay estimates by Umberger et al. 
(2003), they calculated an "aggregate willingness to pay" in the beef industry alone of 
almost $3 billion. Van Sickle et al. also noted other potential benefits such as increased 
consumer confidence in the labeled product. Plain and Grimes (2003) questioned the 
relevance of  using willingness-to-pay estimates to project benefits from COOL. They 
noted 69% to 73% of  survey respondents in the study by Umberger et al. indicated a 
willingness to pay a premium for beef labeled as a U.S. product. They argue that since 
almost 90% of muscle cuts of beef and about 75% of ground beef are already of U.S. origin, 
consumers will not have to pay a premium for U.S. beef even though a fairly large per- 
centage of them express a willingness to do so. 
In  August 2003, the  U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded the  USDA's 
initial cost estimates were too high and questioned many of  the USDA's initial cost 
assumptions. In October 2003, the USDA released its "Proposed Rule on Mandatory 
County-of-Origin  Labeling."  In this document, the  USDA estimated record-keeping costs 
of  $582 million for the first year of development and ongoing costs of $458 million for 
maintenance and operation of record keeping. In addition to these direct record-keeping 
costs, the USDA projected additional capital costs could be as much as $3.9 billion. 
As with any economic analysis, the results of existing COOL analyses depend on the 
underlying assumptions. Some authors estimate costs based on a fully traceable system 
(e.g., Sparks Companies, Inc., 2003; Hayes and Meyer, 2003), while other estimates 
simply report costs for a segregated system (e.g., VanSickle et al., 2003). Although COOL 
regulations do not require full traceability, it is possible such a system might arise to 
reduce liability. From the  onset, the  USDAhas been consistent in  its  contention that the 1 88  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
law would require a traceable system, a stance in accord with other USDA labeling 
guidelines (e.g., organic). At present, however, it is difficult to evaluate whether any 
given assumption is reasonable (particularly with respect to costs) since regulations 
have not yet been fmalized and implemented. In addition, it is difficult to assess the 
reliability of  any particular cost estimate, as most of the parties who have released cost 
estimates have a vested interest in the outcome of  COOL. For this reason, a more flex- 
ible approach to evaluating the potential impact of  COOL is needed-an  approach that 
permits consideration of  alternative assumptions. This research introduces such an 
approach based on the equilibrium displacement model. 
The Model 
An equilibrium displacement model is used to determine the effects of  COOL on meat 
producers and consumers (Wohlgenant, 1993).  In general, the model comprises  horizon- 
tally linked beef, pork, and poultry demands at  the retail level as well as vertical link- 
ages between the farm, wholesale, and retail sectors. Importantly, the model permits 
variable proportions by incorporating the elasticity of  substitution between farm and 
marketing inputs. The benefit of  employing this model is that it provides a straight- 
forward means of  incorporating the three potential effects of  COOL on meat producers: 
the added cost to producers, the added cost to processors and retailers, and the potential 
increase in consumer demand. We begin by discussing a simple one-sector model. 
One-Sector Model 
Although a simple one-sector model ignores important issues such as substitutability 
between meats at the retail level and international trade, it is included here for two 
reasons. First, in multiple-sector models with endogenous feedback, it can be quite 
difficult to analytically determine the effect of  an exogenous shock on the welfare of 
consumers (see Alston, 1991).  Because one of  the primary issues associated with COOL 
is identifying how costs are shared across the system, we are interested in determining 
how the increased costs of  COOL will be borne by producers and consumers. To accomp- 
lish this, a one-sector model is employed. Second, the simple model provides clear insight 
into a number of  issues because analytical solutions are readily obtained and manipu- 
lated. The one-sector model is specified as: 
where the superscript R denotes retail prices and quantities, the superscript F denotes 
farm prices and quantities, and the subscripts i denote either beef or pork, depending 
upon which sector is analyzed. The terms Q:  and P: are percentage changes in quantity 
and price of  the ith meat at the  jth market level, respectively [i.e., x = dln(X)  = dXIX1. Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Countiy-of-Origin Labeling  189 
Demand elasticities are represented by qii,  Si is the farmers' share of  the retail dollar 
for the ith meat in decimal form, ai is the elasticity of  substitution between meat i and 
marketing inputs, and E,  is the supply elasticity of  meat i. 
Equation (1)  represents retail meat demand in elasticity form; equation (2)  is a mark- 
up equation (or inverse retail supply curve) assuming constant returns to scale in meat 
processing and retailing; equation (3) represents derived demand assuming constant 
returns to scale in meat processing and retailing; and equation (4) is the farm-level in- 
verse supply curve for meat i. Exogenous shocks to the system of equations are given by 
4,  y,, and ki,  where Gi represents the percentage change in the initial equilibrium price 
for meat i due to an exogenous demand shift (e.g., the percentage increase in consumer 
willingness to pay for the initial quantity of  meat i due to the new labeling policy). 
Parameters yi and ki represent exogenous shocks, expressed in percentage terms, to 
marketing and farm supply, respectively. In the case of  COOL, yi and ki  will be negative 
to represent added costs to the system. The assumptions of  the model are as follows: the 
meat processing and retailing industries are  characterized  by constant returns to scale,2 
the supply curve of marketing inputs is perfectly elastic, the displacement of supply and 
demand curves is parallel, and all sectors are characterized by perfect competition. 
Analytical solutions for changes in farm price and quantity are written as: 
where the subscripts denoting meat type have been dropped for c~nvenience.~  Given 
these solutions, changes in producer surplus and consumer surplus are represented by: 
(7)  APS  = pF&~(PF*  + k)(1  + 0.5QF*), 
Given the analytical solutions above, some key issues can now be addressed. One 
question often asked in the COOL debate is how consumers will respond to the new 
labeling policy. At present, it is clear that COOL will introduce a cost to the production 
system (via y andlor k in the model). Although evidence of consumer response to the 
policy is sparse, one can ask how much consumer demand would have to increase to 
offset any producer surplus losses which would be incurred from COOL. To analytically 
determine this value, first note that in equation (7), changes in producer surplus can be 
characterized by investigating changes in (PF'  + k). We set APS equal to zero (meaning 
producers, in the aggregate, are neither benefited nor harmed by COOL), use equation 
Although economies of scale may exist at low output levels, existing research finds either very minimal returns to scale 
or constant returns to scale (e.g.,  Hahn and Green, 2000; MacDonald et al., 1999; Morrison Paul, 2001; Thurman, 1987). Our 
model could be altered to incorporate returns to scale following an approach such as employed by Craniield (2002);  however, 
empirical evidence on the magnitude of "returns to scale"  parameters would generate  very similar results to the model used 
in our analysis. 
The analytical  solutions  presented in  Wohlgenant (1993)  contain typographical errors. The formulas in equations  (5) and 
(6)  are the correct solutions. 190  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(51, and solve (pF'  + k) for 6. After a bit of algebra, the change in consumer demand 
needed to offset COOL costs is given by: 
Equation (9) can be used to address several issues. First, it is apparent that if a = 0 
(market is characterized by fured proportions) and y = 0 (costs are all borne by produ- 
cers), then 6* = -kS, which implies, for example, that if producer costs are increased by 
1%  due to COOL, then retail demand must increase by (O.Ol)S(lOO)%  to make producers 
welfare neutral, where again S is the farmers' share of  the retail dollar. 
Some simple comparative statics from equation (9)  yield the following insights: (a)  if 
producers' costs increase (i.e., k becomes more negative), then consumer demand must 
increase to make producers welfare neutral; (b)  if packers' and retailers' costs increase 
(i.e., y  becomes more negative), then consumer demand must increase to make 
producers welfare neutral; (c) if COOL costs are borne totally by the producers (y = 0; 
k c  O), and if a (the elasticity of  substitution between farm and marketing inputs) 
increases, then consumer demand must increase  to make producers welfare neutral; and 
(d)  if COOL costs are totally borne by packers and processors (y c  0; k = 01, and if a (the 
elasticity of substitution between farm and marketing inputs) increases, then consumer 
demand must decrease to make producers welfare neutral. 
The simple model outlined by  equations (1)-(4) can also be used to address another 
issue: how are producers affected by the increased costs imposed on the meat packers 
and retailers by COOL? To consider this issue, we again return to equation (7)  and note 
that the sign of  (7) is determined by the sign of  (pF'  + k). Thus, we seek to determine 
when (pF'  + k)  > 0. Specifically, what conditions must hold for producer surplus to 
increase when packers and processors incur additional costs, such as those imposed by 
COOL. 
After a bit of  algebra, for producer surplus to increase when packers and processors 
incur additional costs (assuming producers bear none of the COOL costs), we find 
that  1 q  1  c  a. In other words, if the absolute value of the retail elasticity of  demand for 
beef is less than the elasticity of  substitution between beef and marketing inputs, then 
producers might actually benefit from COOL if all COOL costs are  borne by packers and 
retailers even if consumer demand for beef does not increase. As  shown later in the 
analysis, this condition is a plausible scenario for the beef sector, but is less likely for 
pork. This is not to say that COOL will affect a, but only that the magnitude of  a will 
most definitely have an effect on the welfare changes associated with COOL. The key 
is that magnitude of a relative to q strongly affects whether and to what extent farmers 
are benefited or harmed by costs imposed on the marketing sector. 
Three-Sector  Model 
Although the simple one-sector model provides some clarity about the issues affecting 
the distribution of  costs in a sector, it ignores substitutability between meats at the 
retail level. The three-sector model, ignoring trade for the moment, is given as follows: Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Country-of-Origin  Labeling  19 1 
where the subscripts B, P,  and C denote beef, pork, and chicken, respectively. Equations 
(10)-(12) are  demand equations for beef, pork, and chicken, respectively, in  elasticity 
form; equations (13)-(15) are  mark-up equations for each meat (or inverse retail supply 
curves); equations (16)-(18) represent derived demand for beef, pork, and chicken, 
respectively; and equations (19)-(21) are  farm-level inverse supply curves for beef, pork, 
and  chicken, respectively. An additional assumption of the  three-sector model is  that  the 
products (beef, pork, and chicken) are independent in production with no specialized 
factors in common. 
Once parameter values have been assigned, the above system of equations can be 
solved using matrix algebra. The result is an  explicit solution for changes in endogenous 
variables, which are percentage changes in prices and quantities of beef, pork, and 
chicken at  the retail and farm levels. Once these values have been determined, the 
change in producer surplus for meat i can be calculated as: 
where the asterisks in the superscripts denote the solutions to the system of solved 
equations. 
Three-Sector Mo&l  Incorporating Trade 
Because one of the primary issues surrounding COOL is the effect of the policy on trade, 
we extend the model as outlined by equations (10H21) to incorporate imports of beef and 
pork. With COOL, consumers will be able to differentiate between foreign and domestic 192  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
meat, and this model extension takes into account this substitution po~sibilit~.~  Most 
trade models simply treat imported and exported goods as identical products at the 
retail level, but with COOL, consumers can differentiate between imported and domestic 
meats. As such, five interrelated demand equations are needed: demand for domestic 
beef, demand for foreign beef, demand for domestic pork, demand for foreign pork, and 
demand for chicken (which we treat as  a single homogeneous commodity). To the extent 
COOL increases consumer demand, it will likely only increase demand for domestic 
meat; thus demand shifters are included only for domestic meat products. We now must 
also incorporate five supply equations, the first three being identical to equations (19)- 
(21)  for domestic production, and two additional equations denoting foreign supplies of 
beef and pork to the United States. To complete the model, we add in the corresponding 
equations at the marketing level for foreign meats. The complete model contains 20 
equations: five retail demand equations, five mark-up equations, five derived demand 
equations, and five supply equations. The entire model is provided in the appendix. 
Methods 
To apply the model to the beef, pork, and chicken industries, values are assigned to the 
model parameters. Rather than attempting to directly estimate these values, following 
Cranfield (2002), Wohlgenant (1993),  James and Alston (2002), and others, we rely on 
preexisting estimates of parameter values reported in the literature. This approach is 
taken because there already exist credible estimates of  the parameter values in the 
literature. Table 1  reports model parameters and the sources for the parameter values. 
The single-sector model outlined in equations (1)-(4) only makes use of the parameters 
relating to beef or pork, depending upon which sector is analyzed. The three-sector model 
outlined in equations (10)-(21)  makes use of all the parameters defined in table 1. The 
three-sector model with trade uses all values outlined in table 1, along with additional 
demand parameters that specify how domestic meat demand responds to changes in 
prices of  foreign beef and pork, and vice versa. In general, we set these values equal to 
their domestic counterparts, but use economic intuition to determine the remaining 
 value^.^ We also set the foreign elasticities of  supply at 10, following Lemieux and 
Wohlgenant (1989). 
The remaining values needed to implement the models are cost estimates. In the 
subsequent analysis, several different scenarios are analyzed. These scenarios vary by 
the magnitude of the cost estimate and by who bears the cost. To determine the poten- 
tial costs of COOL, we use the estimates reported by Vansickle et al. (2003) for a low 
estimate of COOL costs, and estimates reported by Sparks Companies, Inc. (2003) for 
a high estimate of COOL costs. To translate the cost estimates reported in these papers 
into the percentage cost shifts (y and k)  required in the model, we follow Unnevehr, 
Gomez, and Garcia (1998) and divide total annual costs from COOL by total annual 
revenue of the respective industry. 
" Because the food service sector is exempt from COOL regulations, there is potential for the marketing channel to divert 
foreign meat to the food service establishments and domestic meat to the retail establishments. Our  aggregate-level model, 
while not drawing a distinction between food service and retail establishments, does take into account substitutability 
between domestic and foreign meat. If the USDA requires full traceability  (as it appears might happen),  then all parties in 
the marketing channel will bear record-keeping costs regardless of whether they sell only domestic or foreign beef. 
'  The complete set of values is provided in the appendix. Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Country-of-Origin Labeling  193 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Values Used in Analysis 



















Own-price elasticity of demand for beef" 
Cross-price elasticity of beef with respect to pork" 
Cross-price elasticity of beef with respect to chicken" 
Cross-price elasticity of pork with respect to beef" 
Own-price elasticity of demand for pork" 
Cross-price elasticity of pork with respect to chickena 
Cross-price elasticity of chicken with respect to beef" 
Cross-price elasticity of chicken with respect to pork" 
Own-price elasticity of demand for chicken" 
Beef farmers' share of retail dollarb 
Pork farmers' share of retail dollarb 
Chicken farmers' share of retail dollarb 
Elasticity of substitution between beef and marketing inputs ' 
Elasticity of substitution between pork and marketing inputs ' 
Elasticity of substitution between chicken and marketing inputs ' 
Own-price elasticity of supply for beef 
Own-price elasticity of supply for porkd 
Own-price elasticity of supply for chicken 
Total farm revenue for beef ($ millions)" 
Total farm revenue for pork ($ millions)' 
Total farm revenue for chicken ($ millions) 
Sources: 
" Brester and Schroeder (1995) 
USDAIERS, average value from years 1998-2002 
'  Wohlgenant (1989) 
Wohlgenant (1993) 
" Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC), average value from years 2001-2002  for steers and heifers 
LMIC, average value from years 2001-2002  for barrows and gilts 
LMIC, average value from years 2001-2002  for broilers 
Statistics  reported by Vansickle et  al. (2003)  imply (ignoring  initial start-up  costs) 
recurring annual costs from COOL would range from about $36 million to $132 million 
(depending upon whether producers bear any COOL costs) for the beef sector, and $25 
million to $32 million for the pork sector. Dividing these values by the revenue figures 
reported in table 1  shows that COOL would increase costs by about 0.5% for beef and 
about 0.25% for pork. These values are taken to represent the lower-bound cost esti- 
mates of COOL. 
To obtain an upper bound on COOL cost estimates, we use the statistics reported by 
Sparks Companies, Inc. (2003).  Sparks  reports COOL would cost the  beef sector approx- 
imately $1.620 billion and the pork sector approximately $452 million. Dividing these 
statistics by the  revenue figures reported in table 1  suggests COOL would increase costs 
by about 6.5%  for beef and about 3%  for pork. Several scenarios are  investigated for both 
lower-bound and upper-bound estimates in the analysis where these costs are borne in 
different proportions by producers and marketers (processors and retailers). 194  August 2004 
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Tables 2 and 3 present results for the  single-market model for beef, assuming a different 
own-price elasticity of demand in each table. Note, in both of these tables, three differ- 
ent levels of cost increases are considered and demand is assumed to be unchanged by 
COOL. In addition to investigating the impact of different levels of cost increases, this 
analysis considers the incidence of cost increases (i.e., whether the  cost increase is  borne 
by producers or marketers). Four possibilities are examined for the incidence of  cost 
increases: (a)  all of the  increase is imposed on producers, (b)  the increase is split equally 
between producers and marketers, (c) one-fourth of the increase is borne by producers 
and three-fourths by marketers, and (d)  all of the cost increase is borne by marketers. 
In every scenario, table 2 reveals the effect of  an increase in costs due to COOL is 
negative for consumer surplus. Declines in consumer surplus range from -  $23.06 million 
(when cost increases are at  the low end of estimates and are all borne by producers) to 
-$3,550.87  million (when cost increases are at the high end of  estimates and are all 
borne by marketers). In three of  the four cost scenarios, producer surplus declines as 
costs increase; however, the most striking result in table 2 is that if all of the cost in- 
crease is borne by marketers, producer surplus actually increases even though consumer 
demand is left unchanged in the model. As noted in the discussion of  the analytical 
model, this outcome is a result of  the fact that the absolute value of  the own-price 
elasticity of  demand for beef is less than the value of  the elasticity of  substitution 
between beef and marketing inputs. In table 2, the absolute value of the own-price 
elasticity of  demand for beef is 0.56, and the value of  the elasticity of  substitution is 
0.72. Even though table 2 shows a case where producer welfare could increase due to the 
policy, it is important to note that aggregate welfare (consumer + producer surplus) is 
never made better off by the policy. Indeed, in the last column where producers benefit 
from the policy, consumer demand would have to increase from 8.2% (low cost estimate) 
to 10.8%  (high cost estimate) to make consumers welfare neutral. 
In the literature, it  is possible to find estimates for the own-price elasticity of demand 
for beef which fall above and below the elasticity of substitution. Consequently, we also 
report results from a single-market model for beef using an own-price elasticity of 
demand that is larger (in absolute value) than the elasticity of  substitution, as shown 
in table 3. Note that in this case, producer surplus declines with any cost increase, 
regardless of the incidence of the cost. Changes in producer surplus range from -$8.14 
million when cost increases are at  the low end of estimates and all borne by marketers 
to -$1,315.62 when costs are at the high end of estimates and all borne by producers. 
One interesting result observed from tables 2 and 3 is that as costs are increasingly 
borne by the processors and retailers, consumers are made increasingly worse off. This 
situation poses a complex problem for proposals such as  the one put forth by Vansickle 
et al. (2003), advocating that policies pass all costs of COOL on to marketers. Such an 
approach, while beneficial for producers, is quite harmful to consumers if they do not 
react in a positive manner to the new label. 
Tables 2 and 3 also report the  magnitude of demand increase which would be required 
to exactly offset any loss in producer surplus due to the cost increase. For example, 
results in table 3 indicate that if all costs are borne by producers and COOL increases 
producers' costs by 6.5%, then consumer demand (willingness to pay) must increase 
by 6.24% to make producers no worse off than they were before COOL was imposed. Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Countv-of-Origin Labeling  195 
Table 2. Effect of COOL  Costs on Beef Producers and Consumers: Single-Market 
Model Assuming No Demand Change (own-price elasticity of demand = -0.56) 
Description 
Low Cost Estimate (0.5%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.) 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.) 
Percentage change in farm quantity 
Percentage change in farm price 
Increase in demand (willingness to pay) needed 
to make producers welfare neutral 
Medium Cost Estimate (3%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.) 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.) 
Percentage change in farm quantity 
Percentage change in farm price 
Increase in demand (willingness to pay) needed 
to make producers welfare neutral 
High Cost Estimate (6.5%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.) 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.) 
Percentage change in farm quantity 
Percentage change in farm price 
Increase in demand (willingness to pay) needed 
to make producers welfare neutral 
Scenarios 
All Cost  Cost  Cost  All Cost 
Borneby  Shared:  Shared:  Borne by 
Producers  50/50  25/75  Marketers 
As costs increase and as  producers bear a larger portion of the cost, the  magnitude of the 
shift in demand needed to offset the impact of the cost increase becomes greater. With 
reference to table 2, given a large cost increase paid entirely by producers, it  would take 
an increase in demand of  approximately 7.5% to make up for lost producer surplus. 
Table 4 presents results of  the single-market model for pork.6 Estimates of  cost 
increases for the pork industry due to COOL are considerably lower than for beef because 
of  the more integrated structure of the pork market. Thus, for this analysis, the three 
levels of  cost increases considered for the pork industry are lower than the increases 
considered for the beef industry. For pork, declines in consumer surplus range from 
-  $15.30 million to -  $1,263.58 million. Producer surplus  losses range from -  $13.01 million 
to -$202.20 million. The increase in demand required to offset the loss in producer 
surplus ranges from a demand increase of 0.12%  corresponding to a small cost increase 
borne exclusively by marketers, to an increase of  1.92% corresponding to a large cost 
increase born exclusively by producers. Again, as costs are moved from the producers 
to the processors and retailers, consumers are made increasingly worse off. 
Although the single-market models are useful for investigating how costs are  distrib- 
uted in a system and for determining how consumer demand would have to change to 
Because the elasticity of substitution between pork and marketing inputs is quite low in relation to the absolute value 
of  common estimates for the own-price elasticity of pork, it seems unnecessary to conduct sensitivity analysis on the value 
of  the own-price elasticity. Thus only one table of results is presented for the pork model. 196  August 2004  Journal ofAgricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Effect of COOL Costs on Beef Producers and Consumers: Single-Market 
Model Assuming No Demand Change (own-price  elasticity of demand = -0.78) 
Description 
Low Cost Estimate (0.5%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.) 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.) 
Percentage change in farm quantity 
Percentage change in farm price 
Increase in demand (willingness  to pay) needed 
to make producers welfare neutral 
Medium Cost Estimate (3%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.) 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.) 
Percentage change in farm quantity 
Percentage change in farm price 
Increase in demand (willingness  to pay) needed 
to make producers welfare neutral 
High Cost Estimate (6.5%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.) 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.) 
Percentage change in farm quantity 
Percentage change in farm price 
Increase in demand (willingness to pay) needed 
to make producers welfare neutral 
Scenarios 
All Cost  Cost  Cost  All Cost 
Borne by  Shared:  Shared:  Borneby 
Producers  50150  25175  Marketers 
offset a particular cost, the model ignores consumers' ability to substitute between dif- 
ferent meats as  prices change due  to COOL. As previously noted, in the  multiple-market 
model, it  is impossible to arrive at  analytical solutions for changes in consumer surplus. 
However, changes in producer surplus for all sectors represented in the model can be 
readily obtained using the multiple-market model. Table 5 presents results from the 
beef, pork, and chicken  joint market model under a number of different scenarios related 
to the level of cost increase, the allocation of the cost increase, and changes in demand. 
A few points about table 5 bear special attention. First, under the assumption of con- 
stant  demand, (i.e., consumer demand does not change after COOLis implemented), any 
increase in costs for beef and pork resulting from COOL (regardless of who pays the 
costs) increases producer surplus for the poultry industry. Second, assuming constant 
demand, beef and pork producers are generally worse off under COOL if they bear any 
more than about one-fourth of the cost increase. Third, assumptions related to demand 
clearly have an important impact on resulting producer surplus estimates. For example, 
if beef and pork demand increase by  as little as 2%, producer surplus in the pork 
industry will increase in spite of COOL except in the case where costs are at  the high 
end of estimates and are  borne completely by producers. Finally, while there are several 
cases where it appears all producers (beef, pork, and chicken) benefit from COOL, this 
result does not imply that aggregate welfare increases. As documented in tables 2, 3, 
and 4, although an  increase in the cost to marketers increases welfare for producers, it 
harms consumers. As such, consumer demand shifts (6)  would have to be quite large to Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Country-of-Origin Labeling  197 
Table 4. Effect of COOL Costs on Pork Producers and Consumers: Single-Market 
Model Assuming No Demand Change 
Scenarios 
All Cost  Cost  Cost  All Cost 
Borne by  Shared:  Shared:  Borne by 
Description  Producers  50150  25/75  Marketers 
Low Cost Estimate (0.25%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.)  -$16.90  -$14.95  -$13.98  -$13.01 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.)  -$15.30  -$60.76  -$83.48  -$106.20 
Percentage change in farm quantity  -0.05%  -0.05%  -0.04%  -0.04% 
Percentage change in farm price  0.12%  0.01%  -0.05%  -0.10% 
Increase in demand (willingness  to pay) needed  0.16%  0.14%  0.13%  0.12% 
to make producers welfare neutral 
Medium  Cost Estimate (1%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.)  -$67.54  -$59.77  -$55.88  -$51.99 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.)  -$61.19  -$242.74  -$333.33  -$423.81 
Percentage change in farm quantity  -0.21%  -0.19%  -0.17%  -0.16% 
Percentage change in farm price  0.48%  0.04%  -0.18%  -0.40% 
Increase in demand (willingness  to pay) needed  0.64%  0.57%  0.53%  0.49% 
to make producers welfare neutral 
High Cost Estimate (3%): 
Change in producer surplus ($ mil.)  -$202.20  -$178.97  -$167.35  -$155.72 
Change in consumer surplus ($ mil.)  -  $183.41  -  $725.65  -$995.15  -$1,263.58 
Percentage change in farm quantity  -0.63%  -0.56%  -0.52%  -0.49% 
Percentage change in farm price  1.43%  0.11%  -0.55%  -1.21% 
Increase in demand (willingness  to pay) needed  1.92%  1.70%  1.59%  1.48% 
to make producers welfare neutral 
make consumers, as a whole, in favor of COOL, especially if costs are primarily borne 
by marketers. 
A fmal specification of the equilibrium displacement model was used to examine the 
impact of COOL on producer surplus when trade is considered. Assumptions related to 
cost levels and demand shifts are the same as in the model without trade (table 5). 
Regarding the allocation of costs, it is assumed foreign producers bear none of the costs 
associated with COOL. Domestic and foreign marketers bear a cost proportional to their 
aggregate share of the market. For example, if domestic beef accounts for 85% of total 
supply in the U.S. retail market, then COOL costs allocated to the marketing sector 
were paid 85% by domestic marketers and 15%  by foreign marketers. Table 6 presents 
results of the multiple-market model with trade. Overall, results are similar to those 
presented in  table 5. While the levels of changes in producer surplus are different when 
trade is considered, the basic pattern of gains and losses in relation to cost and demand 
changes remains the same. 
Figures 1  and 2 illustrate the welfare changes for beef and pork, respectively, under 
the assumption of no demand change. As shown in figure 1, if beef producers bear more 
than 25% of the  costs associated with COOL, then welfare losses can be expected. While 
all cost assumptions (low, medium, and high) predict similar welfare changes when 
producers bear about 25% of  the costs, they generate vastly divergent predictions if 
producers bear most of the cost. Figure 2 shows similar results for pork, with one pri- 
mary exception: the  welfare-neutral point, in terms of percentage of costs borne, is  about 198  August ZOO4  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 5. Effect of COOL  Costs on Changes in Meat Producer Surplus: Multiple- 
Market Model without Trade ($ millions) 
All Cost  Cost  Cost  All Cost 
Borneby  Shared:  Shared:  Borne by 
Description  F'roducers  50150  25/75  Marketers 
SCENARIO: 
-No  Demand Change - 
Low Cost Estimate (Beef = 0.5%,  Pork = 0.25%): 
c Change in beef producer surplus  -97.67  -31.85  1.07  33.99 
Change in pork producer surplus  -15.17  -3.87  1.78  7.43 
Change in chicken producer surplus  2.21  13.24  18.76  24.28 
Medium Cost Estimate (Beef = 3%, Pork = 1%):  .  Change in beef producer surplus  -587.14  -199.07  -4.69  189.93  .  Change in pork producer surplus  -57.37  6.03  37.78  69.56  .  Change in chicken producer surplus  12.31  75.81  107.62  139.47 
High Cost Estimate (Beef = 6.5%,  Pork = 3%):  .  Change in beef producer surplus  -1,266.10  -417.61  10.55  435.36  .  Change in pork producer surplus  -  179.99  -35.71  29.01  109.22  .  Change in chicken producer surplus  28.26  170.85  234.29  314.29 
Low Cost Estimate (Beef = 0.5%, Pork = 0.25%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  .  Change in pork producer surplus  .  Change in chicken producer surplus 
Medium Cost Estimate (Beef = 3%, Pork = 1%):  .  Change in beef producer surplus  .  Change in pork producer surplus  .  Change in chicken producer surplus 
High Cost Estimate (Beef = 6.5%, Pork = 3%): 
Change in beef producer surplus 
Change in pork producer surplus 
Change in chicken producer surplus 
SCENARIO: 
-  2%  Demand Increase for Beef and Pork - 
Low Cost Estimate (Beef = 0.5%,  Pork = 0.25%):  .  Change in beef producer surplus  .  Change in pork producer surplus  .  Change in chicken producer surplus 
Medium Cost Estimate (Beef = 3%, Pork = 1%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  .  Change in pork producer surplus  .  Change in chicken producer surplus 
High Cost Estimate (Beef = 6.5%, Pork = 3%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  .  Change in pork producer surplus 
c Change in chicken producer surplus 
SCENARIO: 
-  5%  Demand Increase for Beef and Pork - Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Country-of-Origin  Labeling  199 
Table 6. Effect of COOL Costs on Changes in Meat Producer Surplus: Multiple- 
Market Model with Trade ($ millions) 
Cost Shared by 
Cost  Domestic Producers 
Borne by  and Marketers:  All Cost 
Domestic  Borne by 
Description  Producers  50150  25175  Marketers 
SCENARIO: 
-No  Demand Change - 
Low Cost Estimate (Beef = 0.5%, Pork = 0.25%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  -97.63  -31.31  1.85  35.03 
Change in pork producer surplus  - 15.15  -2.67  3.58  9.82 
Change in  chicken producer surplus  2.24  13.45  19.06  24.67 
Medium Cost Estimate (Beef = 3%, Pork = 1%): 
Change in  beef producer surplus  -  586.92  -  195.42  0.69  197.04 
Change in  pork producer surplus  -57.26  9.13  42.38  75.66 
Change in chicken producer surplus  12.46  76.94  109.24  141.58 
High Cost Estimate (Beef = 6.5%,  Pork = 3%): 
Change in  beef producer surplus  -1,265.59  -410.41  18.88  559.77 
Change in  pork producer surplus  -  179.72  -22.10  57.00  329.64 
Change in  chicken producer surplus  28.61  173.50  246.28  408.18 
SCENARIO: 
-  2%  Demand Increase for  Beef and Pork - 
Low Cost Estimate (Beef = 0.5%, Pork = 0.25%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  190.63  257.06  290.28  323.51 
Change in pork producer surplus  143.78  156.33  162.60  168.88 
Change in  chicken producer surplus  -72.10  -60.92  -55.33  -49.73 
Medium Cost Estimate (Beef = 3%,  Pork = 1%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  -299.54  92.66  289.12  485.81 
Change in pork producer surplus  101.47  168.19  201.60  235.04 
Change in  chicken producer surplus  -61.90  2.37  34.57  66.81 
High Cost Estimate (Beef = 6.5%, Pork = 3%): 
Change in beef producer surplus 
Change in  pork producer surplus 
Change in chicken producer surplus 
Low Cost Estimate (Beef = 0.5%,  Pork = 0.25%): 
Change in beef producer surplus 
Change in  pork producer surplus 
Change in  chicken producer surplus 
-979.42  -  122.72  307.34  849.19 
-21.60  136.80  216.29  490.27 
-45.81  98.63  171.18  332.57 
SCENARIO: 
-  5%  Demand Increase for Beef and Pork - 
Medium Cost Estimate (Beef = 3%, Pork = 1%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  132.49  525.74  722.72  919.93 
Change in pork producer surplus  341.02  408.23  441.89  475.58 
Change in chicken producer surplus  -  173.01  -  109.04  -76.99  -44.90 
High Cost Estimate (Beef = 6.5%,  Pork = 3%): 
Change in beef producer surplus  -549.20  309.79  740.98  1,284.27 
Change in pork producer surplus  217.05  376.61  456.69  732.67 
Change in  chicken producer surplus  -  156.99  -  13.23  58.97  219.61 200  August 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
t  Medium Cost Estimate 
-$1,400 
Percentage of COOL Costs Borne by Beef Cattle Producers 
Figure 1. Effects of COOL  on changes in beef producer surplus 
from multiple market model with trade and no demand change 
+Low  Cost Estimate 
t  Medium Cost Estimate 
t  High Cost Estimate  1 
-$300 -] 
Percentage of COOL Costs Borne by Pork Producers 
Figure 2. Effects of COOL on changes in pork producer surplus 
from multiple market model with trade and no demand change Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Country-o$Origin Labeling  20 1 
50%  for pork producers, where it was about 25%  for beef producers. That is, unless pork 
producers bear more than about 50% of the costs associated with COOL, they could 
actually benefit from the policy even if demand does not change. The primary reason for 
this result is that the cost estimates are relatively higher for beef than pork. If a 
relatively higher cost is imposed on beef than pork, then pork producers can expect to 
benefit due  to consumers substituting away from the  now relatively more expensive beef 
to relatively less expensive pork. 
In addition to the direct welfare losses captured by the model, it is important to 
recognize that there could be other indirect welfare losses due to COOL. For example, 
hog and cattle producers in the northern United States depend on imports of stocker 
cattle and feeder pigs from Canada. These U.S. producers will likely lose as a result of 
COOL because they will no longer be able to claim U.S. origin. Consequently, COOL 
could increase the  incentive  of Canadian producers to  feed these animals until slaughter 
rather than exporting them to the United States. 
Summary  and Conclusions 
In this study, an equilibrium displacement model was constructed to investigate the 
impact of cost increases associated with country-of-origin  labeling (COOL)  requirements 
on producer and consumer welfare. The approach employed in this study is unique in 
two respects. First, this methodology yields results that are not contingent upon any 
single set of assumptions related to COOL implementation. Second, this approach 
permits an  investigation of the impact of COOL, while explicitly considering the inter- 
relationships among  beef, pork, and poultry markets. Third, rather than simply examin- 
ing aggregate costs of COOL, this approach permits costs to be passed throughout the 
market via supply and demand elasticities, thereby providing insight into  how costs will 
be distributed among producers and consumers of the  various meats. 
Results of this study  highlight an  important issue for policy makers and those charged 
with implementing policy, because the way USDA interprets COOL provisions of the 
Farm Bill when writing regulations for its implementation will have a tremendous 
impact on who benefits from and who is harmed by COOL. Results of the single-sector 
model indicate that a regulatory structure  in which most costs are  borne by marketers, 
with producers exempt from all  but minimal requirements for documentation and record 
keeping, will have a relatively small  negative impact on producers but a relatively large 
negative impact on consumers (unless COOL does, as some argue it will, lead to an  in- 
crease in demand). In contrast, a regulatory structure  in  which most costs are  ultimately 
borne by producers will have a much larger negative impact on producer surplus. To the 
extent that retailers and packers require documentation from producers on the origin 
of their livestock, producers will bear a larger portion of the regulatory burden and 
larger welfare losses. 
Results from the  multi-market model again  highlight the  importance of the  allocation 
of  COOL costs. If half or more of  the costs are borne by producers (which, as noted, 
would also likely imply high implementation costs), the negative impact on producer 
surplus will be quite large. In fact, in this scenario, the most likely beneficiaries of 
COOL will be chicken producers, who will benefit from the substitution from pork and 
beef. Another interesting result is that because cost estimates are relatively higher 
for beef than pork, pork producers could benefit while beef producers lose because 202  August 2004  Journal ofAgricultural and Resource Economics 
consumers can substitute away from relatively more expensive beef to relatively less 
expensive pork. 
One result evident from the analysis is that consumers' reaction to COOL will have 
a major impact on the welfare effects of the legislation. If COOL increases demand for 
covered products, losses in producer surplus will be offset. The degree to which the effects 
of  higher costs are offset depends on the magnitude of  demand shifts resulting from 
COOL. Results suggest a 2%  increase in aggregate demand (including all meat cuts and 
meat consumed at  home and away from home) for pork would offset the negative impact 
on producer surplus unless cost increases are quite large and borne almost exclusively 
by producers. A 2% increase in aggregate demand for beef (including all meat cuts and 
meat consumed at home and away from home) would be sufficient to offset negative 
changes in consumer surplus if COOL implementation costs are  low; however, if COOL 
implementation costs fall into the upper half of current estimates, a 2% demand increase 
may not be sufficient to offset reductions in producer surplus. 
Loureiro and Umberger (2003)  estimated premiums for "U.S. Certified" steak and 
hamburger would be 58% and 38%, respectively, if origin labels were implemented. 
Further, Umberger et al. (2003)  found willingness-to-pay premiums as  high as 19%  for 
beef steak advertised as "Guaranteed USA: Born and Raised in the U.S." for consumers 
in Colorado and Illinois. The demand shock in our model (6)  is an aggregate shock 
representing total increase in demand for all cuts and for meat consumed at  home and 
away from home, the latter of which is not included in the COOL policy. Therefore, it 
is unclear how the estimates reported by Loureiro and Umberger, and Umberger et al., 
would translate into an aggregate shock as specified in our model. Perhaps a more 
relevant question is why country-of-origin labels have not voluntarily appeared in the 
market if consumer willingness to pay exceeds costs. Several processors such as Prem- 
ium Standard Farms and Smithfield have the ability to advertise these claims without 
a government mandate. It  is unlikely these firms would forego the profits of a country- 
of-origin label if such profits indeed exist. It  is difficult to make a case for market failure 
in the cause of  COOL, which highlights the need to identify how the costs of the 
mandatory COOL policy will be distributed throughout the marketing channel. 
[Received July 2003;Jinal revision received May 2004.1 
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Appendix: 
Model Incorporating Trade 
The equilibrium displacement model incorporating international trade is given below. 
Demand Equations 204  August 2004  Journal ofAgricuIturaI and Resource Economics 
The subscripts BD, PD, C,  BF, and PF represent domestic beef, domestic pork, chicken, foreign beef, 
and foreign pork, respectively. The remaining variables are defined in the text. 
Inverse Retail Supply Equations 
-R 
(A61  PBD  = s~~P:~  - yBD  > 
(A71  $4 = sPDp:D - Y~D  3 
(AS)  Pf = s,C - y,, 
(A91  p:F  = sBFP:F  - yBF  2 
(A101  Ph=SPF~&-ypF. 
Derived Demand Equations 
Inverse Primary Supply Equations 
Parameter values used to implement the model are shown in table Al. Lusk and Anderson  Effects of Countiy-of-Origin  Labeling  205 
Table Al. Parameter Values Used in Model Incorporating Trade 
Parameter  Definition 
~~BD,BD  Own-price elasticity of demand for domestic beef 
~~BD,PD  Cross-price elasticity of domestic beef with respect to domestic pork 
tla~,c  Cross-price elasticity of domestic beef with respect to chicken 
~BD,BF  Cross-price elasticity of domestic beef with respect to foreign beef 
~~BD,PF  Cross-price elasticity of domestic beef with respect to foreign pork 
~~PD,BD  Cross-price elasticity of domestic pork with respect to domestic beef 
~~PD,PD  Own-price elasticity of demand for domestic pork 
'lp0.c  Cross-price elasticity of domestic pork with respect to chicken 
~PD,BF  Cross-price elasticity of domestic pork with respect to foreign beef 
'~PD,PF  Cross-price elasticity of domestic pork with respect to foreign pork 
~C,BD  Cross-price elasticity of chicken with respect to domestic beef 
tl C,PD  Cross-price elasticity of chicken with respect to domestic pork 
'lc,c  Own-price elasticity of demand for chicken 
~C,BF  Cross-price elasticity of chicken with respect to foreign beef 
%,PF  Cross-price elasticity of chicken with respect to foreign pork 
~~BF,BD  Cross-price elasticity of foreign beef with respect to domestic beef 
~~BF,PD  Cross-price elasticity of foreign beef with respect to domestic pork 
'~BF,C  Cross-price elasticity of foreign beef with respect to chicken 
~~BF,BF  Own-price elasticity of demand for foreign beef 
'~BF,PF  Cross-price elasticity of foreign beef with respect to foreign pork 
'~PF,BD  Cross-price elasticity of foreign pork with respect to domestic beef 
'~PF,PD  Cross-price elasticity of foreign pork with respect to domestic pork 
'~PF,C  Cross-price elasticity of foreign pork with respect to chicken 
I~PF,BF  Cross-price elasticity of foreign pork with respect to foreign beef 
'~PF,PF  Own-price elasticity of demand for foreign pork 
SBD  Domestic beef farmers' share of retail dollar 
SPD  Domestic pork farmers' share of retail dollar 
sc  Chicken farmers' share of retail dollar 
SBF  Foreign beef farmers' share of retail dollar 
SPF  Foreign pork farmers' share of retail dollar 
'JBD  Elasticity of substitution between domestic beef and marketing inputs 
'JPD  Elasticity of substitution between domestic pork and marketing inputs 
'Jc  Elasticity of substitution between chicken and marketing inputs 
'JBF  Elasticity of substitution between foreign beef and marketing inputs 
'JPF  Elasticity of substitution between foreign pork and marketing inputs 
EBD  Own-price elasticity of supply for domestic beef 
EPD  Own-price elasticity of supply for domestic pork 
EC  Own-price elasticity of supply for chicken 
EBF  Own-price elasticity of supply for foreign beef 
EPF  Own-price elasticity of supply for foreign pork 
Value 